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contributed to this reportIn the euro area growth is holding up but the general outlook is less bright than in 
recent years. The anticipated slowdown largely results from the gradual attenuation of the 
post-Great Recession recovery momentum and the convergence of growth rates towards 
a lower potential growth path. It also coincides with a revival of political turmoil, conse-
quently emphasizing the urgency to deal with external downsize risk by strengthening 
internal sources of growth—investment and private consumption. The sun has been 
shining but the opportunity for structural repair has not been taken. Hence, imbalances 
within the euro area need to be addressed in order to achieve sustainable development.
The increase of public debt is one of the main legacies of the crisis. While it is currently 
declining, long-run simulations suggest that without further consolidation, the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio will not reach the arbitrary 60% target by 2035 in a number of coun-
tries. To top it off, countries that are concerned are those whose unemployment rate 
remains above its pre-crisis level, yet the implementation of a new fiscal consolidation 
would result in higher employment. It thus raises the question of this rule's sustainability. 
The euro area as a whole has a large trade surplus, which favors pressures for the appreci-
ation of the euro, which can reduce growth prospects. Unlike the period before the crisis, 
the imbalance is clearly concentrated in surplus countries.
Finally, the aforementioned imbalances make governance reforms more urgent than 
ever. Until now, progress in this area has proved rather timid.
This work led us to three key policy insights. First, the structural adjustment needed to 
bring back public debt to its target would weigh on the reduction of unemployment. 
Euro area countries can pursue an additional fiscal consolidation provided output gap is 
closed, and countries with fiscal leeway should use it to sustain growth in the euro area as 
a whole. 
Secondly, the ongoing debate on the reform of the economic governance of the euro 
area must pay more attention to the evolution of nominal prices and wages, in order to 
reduce the sources of divergence. In the same time, the need to strengthen wage 
bargaining systems by giving the social partners a greater role is important. Finally yet 
importantly, the need for a greater automatic stabilization, including of a cross-border 
nature, in monetary union is undisputed. The proposals under discussion do go to some 
extent in this direction and deserve support.
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1.
This constitutes an important step  
towards forecasting Sustainable    
Development Goal indicators 
(SDGs).
2.
The methodologies used to compute 
forecasts for the poverty rate and 
CO2 emissions are detailed and      
discussed in Chapter 2 and 3 of the 
iASES 2019 report, respectively.
iASES (2019): “The imperative of sus-
tainability—economic, social, envi-
ronmental”, iASES (formely iAGS) 
2019—independent Annual Sustain-
able Economy Survey, 7th Report..After the double dip of 2008-2009 and 2011-2013, the economic outlook in 
the euro area (EA hereafter) experienced an upturn, which resulted in a healthy 2.5% 
GDP growth rate in 2017, against 1.9% the previous year. This recovery has helped to 
reduce the imbalances resulting from the crisis. The unemployment rate fell by almost 
4 points between 2013 and 2017. Budget deficits decreased from 6.2% in 2010 to 1% 
in 2017, which initiated a decrease in aggregate government debt. Current account 
imbalances have also apparently been rolled back. 
However, challenges still loom. There have been signs of an economic slowdown 
since the start of 2018, and new tensions have emerged that might threaten the 
recovery. Recent statistical information is a harbinger of a slowdown of growth coin-
ciding with a revival of political and financial turmoil. The hard bargaining over Brexit
and its still uncertain outcome, the trade war launched by the United States as well as 
the turbulence in some emerging countries and the high volatility of oil prices and 
exchange rates darken the economic outlook and highlight a set of downside risks. In 
iASES 2019, we forecast a slowdown of GDP growth in the European Union as well as in 
the EA between 2018 and 2020 (see Table 1). Partly the slackening is expected, 
resulting from a gradual loss of momentum in the post-Great Recession recovery and 
the convergence of growth rates towards a lower potential pathway. In iASES 2019 we 
extend our forecasts to cover poverty rates and changes in C02 emissions alongside 
GDP and unemployment forecasts1. In most countries, the poverty rate will decline 
while CO2 emissions will rise in 2019-2020 on average in the EU
2.
In 2017, there are still more than 16 million people unemployed in the EU. Despite 
the recent improvement, the social stigma of the crisis remains significant. Thus, the 
expected slowdown in activity will occur in a context where the unemployment rate for 
the euro area as a whole is still markedly above its pre-crisis level. Underemployment is 
particularly severe in Greece, Spain and Italy, countries suffering from the fragility of 
their public finances and their banking system.
iASES 2019 also produces updated medium-term public debt projections. Although 
aggregate public debt is decreasing in the EA, heterogeneity is persisting, as some 
countries face a high and only stabilising or slowly decreasing debt level. The current 
fiscal rules are still stringent and may compel these countries to implement a harder 
than economically warrented consolidation. This would accelerate the economic slow-
down, a point discussed in Part 1. We then turn to the internal imbalances in the EA: 
the current account imbalances have receded, but they have not faded away, and 
nominal adjustment is still needed (Part 2). This is yet again raising the issue of wage 
adjustments and wage policy in the EA. Such further adjustments are likely to be 
pushed onto the same countries most weakened by the crisis, pointing out the need to 
improve European governance (Part 3). In this sense, the EU does not seem to be 
prepared for the next downturn, as huge challenges remain.
Table 1. Unemployment rate, poverty and CO2 emissions forecasts for the European Union
Unemployment rate
(In % of labour force)
Poverty rate 
(% of households)
Change in CO2 Emissions 
(%)
 2017 2018 2019 2020 2017 2018 2019 2020 2017 2018 2019 2020
EUZ* 9.1 8.2 7.8 7.5 17.1 17 16.9 16.9 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.8
EU-28* 7.6 6.9 6.5 6.3 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.3 -0.6 0.9 0.1 0.9
* For the poverty rate and the change in Co2 emissions, we compute aggregates on a smaller set of countries (those avai-
lable), which consist of a population-weighted average and an emission-weighted average, respectively.
Note: The poverty rate is defined as the proportion of individuals in poor households, which are those whose equivalised dis-
posable income is below 60% of the median disposable income.
Sources: Eurostat, National Accounting, iAGS forecast November 2018.
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3.
Details of the model are available 
here https://www.iags-project.org/
documents/iags_appendix2013.pdf.
4.
The fiscal multiplier equals 0.5 when 
the output gap is closed and ends up 
being null in the long run.1. The perilous road to reach the DEBT target of 60%
fiscal consolidation helped stabilizing the debt …
Fiscal rules and targets have been driving the fiscal policies of the EA since its very 
start. The fiscal consolidation implemented between 2010 and 2015 has contributed to 
the stabilization of public debt in most of the EA countries, although often at heavy cost 
in terms of lost output. However, public debt ratios are still high in some countries, 
raising questions about their ability to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio back to 60% as 
required by existing fiscal rules. Besides, the recent debt turmoil in Italy has been high-
lighting the importance of political decisions that put additional upward pressures on 
sovereign risk (as illustrated by the Italian case), thus on the level of public debt. 
Discussions on the need for additional fiscal consolidation will not stop as long as 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is above 60% and has not converged to it: even if there is no 
economic rationale for this figure. Therefore, we simulate the path of public debt-to-
GDP ratios until 2035, which is the horizon of the 1/20th debt rule incorporated in the 
Stability and Growth Pact and in the Fiscal Compact (Box 1).
Box 1. Fiscal rules in the euro area
In principle, each EA country should comply with the following fiscal rules:
■ the country-specific structural deficit targets, the so-called medium-term objectives 
(MTOs);
■ convergence of public debt towards 60% of GDP. The reduction of debt should reach 
1/20th of the difference between the current level of debt and the 60% target on 
average within three years. 
■ an expenditure rule, which limits public expenditure growth (depending on potential 
growth).
At present, the Commission and Council focus in their evaluation of fiscal policies as well 
as their policy recommendations on the first rule, as it is the most restrictive one and it is at 
the center of the TSCG, the so-called Fiscal Compact. However, political attention can 
change quickly, notably when all EA countries comply with the 3% rule for the public deficit, 
as should be the case in 2018.
The model used represents the main countries of the EA: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.3 We 
make three main assumptions in the baseline scenario: 1) all fiscal impulses are null 
beyond 2020, 2) interest rates converge (no risk premium) and inflation expectations 
are anchored to the 2% target at the 2035 horizon, and 3) the fiscal multiplier depends 
on the economy’s position in the cycle.4 In a first exercise, we compute the debt 
dynamics, structural balance, inflation and the GDP growth rate from 2018 to 2035. 
The results are depicted in Table 2.
In a scenario where there is no change in fiscal policy beyond 2020, France, Italy, 
Spain, and Belgium would be the countries—amongst the EA members— which fail to 
reach the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio by 2035. Consequently, these countries would have 
to implement additional fiscal efforts to be able to comply with the debt rule. With a 
public debt-to-GDP ratio of 74%, convergence would be significant in Belgium, while it 
would be rather sluggish for France and Spain. Public debt in Italy would increase until N° 49, 5 février 2019.
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Table 2. Public finance and o
Public debt 
(% of GDP)
(1)
2020
(2)
2035
DEU 56 40
FRA 94 89
ITA 131 143
ESP 96 91
NLD 48 21
BEL 99 74
PRT 120 45
IRL 59 52
GRC 171 60
FIN 60 54
AUT 66 41
EA 84 70
In the baseline scenario, fiscal impuls
Source: iASES (formerly iAGS) 2019 m2035, up to 143% of GDP because of the higher debt burden, i.e. fiscal efforts would 
have to be substantial to meet the 60% criterion. The decomposition of changes in 
debt between the fiscal surplus, the “snow-ball” effect and stock-flow adjustments can 
be found in Box 2. On the other hand, countries experiencing a decrease in the public 
debt below the 60% threshold would benefit from fiscal space. 
Looking at the structural balance also gives information on the situation of the 
public finances. It would deteriorate for Italy, and to a lesser extent in France and Spain, 
due to a slightly decreasing public debt for these countries (Ireland also, however its 
ratio is below 60%). The Netherlands and Portugal would benefit from a surplus, 
increasing the room for manoeuvre to implement a more expansionary fiscal policy in 
the future. 
… But let’s not sacrifice more growth
We then assess whether countries are able to meet the 60% ceiling by 2035. 
Although almost all EA countries would meet the 60% criteria in 2035, this would 
imply a reduction in growth for countries implementing additional fiscal consolidation. 
Growth would then be lower in the EA as a whole, and the heterogeneity in growth 
performance would widen. Growth would also deteriorate in countries that have 
already suffered from the double dip recession. The countries with fiscal space are 
already those in which the unemployment rate has recovered to or is close to pre-crisis 
levels. This clearly questions the social sustainability of such a policy. As illustrated in 
previous reports, a trade-off obviously arises between the debt objective and the 
growth objective.
These simulations suggest that there is still a risk of a new wave of fiscal consolida-
tion in the future, unless the fiscal rules are changed or at least not applied strictly. This 
may still entail output costs, and add deflationary pressures for the EA, and notably in 
countries where the output gap is negative and the unemployment rate high (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and France).
utput performances 
Structural balance 
(% of GDP)
Cumulative 
fiscal impulse
GDP growth rate (%)
Average 
output gap
Inflation rate (%)
(3)
2020
(4)
2035
(5)
2018-2035*
(6)
2018-2020
(7)
2021-2035
(8)
2018-2035
(9)
2018-2020
(10)
2021-2035
-0.2 -0.6 0.9 1.8 1.7 -0.1 1.8 2.1
-1.8 -2.7 -0.5 1.7 1.3 -0.2 1.9 2.1
-2.9 -4.1 1.1 1.0 0.2 -0.2 1.1 2.0
-1.9 -2.7 0.5 2.4 1.3 -0.5 1.5 2.0
0.3 0.6 0.0 2.4 2.0 0.0 1.8 2.2
-1.6 -1.2 0.7 1.7 1.2 0.3 1.6 2.2
0.1 2.9 0.7 2.0 1.4 0.7 1.0 2.0
-3.1 -2.5 -0.5 4.7 3.1 1.4 1.5 2.1
3.0 4.7 1.6 1.9 0.9 -1.2 1.0 2.2
-1.6 -1.6 0.0 2.0 1.1 0.5 1.4 2.1
-1.1 -0.2 0.8 2.3 1.3 0.8 2.8 2.1
-1.2 -1.5 0.4 1.9 1.4 -0.1 1.7 2.1
es are equal to 0 from 2021 to2035.
odel.
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5.
For Greece, we assume that starting 
from 2020, the country implements 
fiscal expansion until its primary   
surplus is 3.5%, as defined in the 
Memorandum.Applying the country-specific structural targets, in other words the MTO rule, coun-
tries that need to do some fiscal consolidation to reach the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio 
would require less adjustment. In this optic, applying the preventive arm of the SGP 
starting from 2021 would be a way to spread the adjustment and to avoid dampening 
the current recovery.5 By 2035, France would reach a 65% debt-to-GDP ratio, Spain 
68% and Italy 108%. 
The conclusions that may be drawn are twofold. First, EA countries should not 
engage in additional fiscal consolidation unless the output gaps are closed. Second, 
countries with fiscal room for manoeuver should use it to sustain growth in the EA. This 
would sustain economic activity in those countries, but with positive spillovers to the 
others, and it would maintain the fall in the unemployment rate without putting at risk 
debt sustainability (the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio could still be achieved in 2035).
Box 2. Decomposition of public debt
Debt variation depends on three things:
■ the primary surplus: a higher primary surplus slows debt progression;
■ stock-flow adjustments: this includes differences in cash and accrual accounting, 
accumulation of financial assets and valuation and other residual effects;
■ a “snow ball” effect: this captures the impact of interest expenditure on accumulated 
debt, as well as the impact of real GDP growth and inflation on the debt ratio.
We present a decomposition of public debt evolutions between 2018 and 2035 for 11 
EA countries under the baseline scenario (no risk premium, no fiscal impulse beyond 2020, 
time-varying fiscal multiplier, hysteresis effects) in the next table (Table 3).
The public debt is decreasing in almost all countries. This is due to a favorable snow-ball 
effect, which turns out to be unfavorable solely for Italy since the latter faces a very low 
potential GDP growth of 0.3% each year in our projection. Apart from Ireland, the primary 
surplus has a negative or null effect on debt variation. Stock-flows have a near-zero impact 
on average on public debt variation, except for Greece, where the annual macro-economic 
database of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (AMECO) reports an important stock-flow adjustment for 2018-2020.
Table 3. Decomposition of average annual public debt ratio variations
Country
Average annual 
Public debt 
variation (in %)
Average annual contribution to debt ratio variation 
between 2018 and 2035 (in percentage points)
2018-2035 Snow-ball effect Primary surplus Stock-flow
DEU -1.3 -0.5 -0.9 0.0
FRA -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.0
ITA 0.6 1.3 -0.7 0.0
ESP -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.1
NLD -2.0 -0.6 -1.4 0.0
BEL -1.6 -0.3 -1.5 0.1
PRT -4.5 -0.2 -4.4 0.1
IRL -0.9 -1.3 0.3 0.1
GRC -6.6 -1.2 -6.0 0.5
FIN -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 0.1
AUT -2.1 -0.6 -1.4 -0.1
Source: iASES (formerly iAGS) 2019 model.N° 49, 5 février 2019.
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6.
In iASES 2019, we compute the      
adjustment of the general price level 
in every euro area economy that 
would be compatible with both an 
internal equilibrium and an external 
equilibrium.2. Correcting current account imbalances requires wages 
policies in the euro area
Assessment of internal imbalances in the euro area
Current account imbalances have been at the heart of the EA crisis. The overall situa-
tion has improved since the crisis hit, but significant imbalances remain. In order to 
assess the evolution of current account imbalances within the EA, iASES 2019 delivers 
an aggregate indicator of the nominal adjustment needs (see Figure 1), which is the 
average (weighted by GDP) of the absolute value of misalignments in the euro area.6
We also report the contribution of each country to this indicator. This gives a measure 
of the heterogeneity among EA countries, while at the same time pointing to the coun-
tries that contribute the most to this heterogeneity.
The picture that emerges from these calculations is that nominal misalignments 
within the EA reached a peak in 2008, at the time the crisis broke out, then substantially 
diminished until 2013, and slightly decreased since 2015. The adjustment effort of the 
Southern countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland and Greece) is very clear, since they 
contributed only 25% to the indicator in 2017 against more than 50% between 2001 
and 2007. This adjustment was not due simply to the contraction in demand, since the 
indicator calculated here corrects for relative output gaps. It was mainly induced by the 
contraction of wages. The indicator is however sensitive to the output gaps used. 
Conversely, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands reduced their nominal undervalua-
tion, but at the same time Germany is now the main contributor to the heterogeneity, 
reflecting the asymmetric nature of the adjustment that took place. Italy remains in a 
rather well-balanced position. 
Even though the situation has improved quite substantially since 2008, it appears 
that there are still significant underlying current account imbalances within the EA, 
especially between France and Germany, where—all other things being equal—a 
Figure 1. Indicator of intra-EA nominal misalignments, with per-country contributions
In % of GDP-deflator weighted by GDP
Source: iASES (formerly iAGS) 2019 calculations.
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N° 49, 5 février 2019.relative nominal price adjustment of 20% is needed. Another way to look at the current 
situation is to compute projections for long-term net international investment positions 
(NIIP, or net foreign assets) if trade balances remained the same as today, i.e. if there 
were no nominal readjustment (and assuming constant asset prices and no other 
adjustments); the result of this exercise is given by Table 4.
These results show that the situation for deficit countries is rather good, since all of 
them except Greece would arrive at an NIIP over the macroeconomic imbalance proce-
dure (MIP) threshold of -35% (and even Greece would improve its position relatively to 
today). The imbalance clearly comes from Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland, 
which would accumulate a huge amount of foreign assets, close to 200% of their 
respective GDPs. Again, this shows the asymmetric nature of the adjustment made so 
far. However, one should not forget that today the EA on aggregate has a large trade 
surplus, which may not last forever, since it creates pressures to appreciate the euro. If 
these pressures were to materialize, substantial external deficits could reappear in 
Southern countries, possibly even leading to a new balance of payments crisis.
Current account adjustments therefore remain an important issue that should be 
addressed by appropriate policies, starting with surplus countries. The goal should be a 
still higher inflation in surplus countries to avoid pushing deficit countries into deflation, 
which points to the need to focus on the evolution of wages. The following analysis of 
wage developments in the EA gives some insights into ways to boost inflation.
Wage developments and policy in the euro area
iASES 2019 examines wage developments in Europe, with a focus on the twelve first 
members of the EA. Looking at nominal wage trends, the most striking feature is the 
wide divergence in nominal wage trajectories up to the crisis, followed by a marked, 
but not complete and asymmetric, convergence since 2008. Very rapid nominal wage 
growth in Greece, Ireland and Spain was followed by a massive correction in the former 
country, and more limited adjustment in the latter two. The downward adjustment has 
also been very pronounced in Portugal, and less so in Italy, following less substantial 
above-average growth pre-crisis. The well-known undershooting in Germany 
(although working time plays a role here) and to a lesser extent Austria is startling; only 
very belatedly and gradually has an upward correction been forthcoming in these 
two countries. 
A closer look at the data indicates two important features: first, a failure of real 
wages to keep pace with productivity, and thus a falling EA wage share; second, a 
failure to anchor inflation close to the ECB target. Evidently, wage-bargainers have 
factored below-target inflation into their pay settlements, in spite of the improving 
labour market situation in almost all countries. “Lowflation” is getting hard-wired into 
the economic system. Amongst other things, this makes the resolution of public debt 
issues more difficult and, more generally, it is a factor behind still-anaemic demand. In 
addition, it reflects the failure to correct the competitive imbalances that had built up in 
a symmetrical fashion; adjustment pressure was applied almost exclusively to the 
former deficit countries.
Table 4. Long-term projections for net international investment positions in the absence of 
nominal adjustments (% of GDP, 20-year horizon) 
AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA GRC IRL ITA NLD PRT
39 15 183 9 15 -19 -72 186 57 224 -32
Source: calculs iASES (précédemment iAGS), 2019.
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7.
Luxembourg and Ireland (where 
GDP numbers especially in recent 
years make interpretation difficult) 
are upper and lower outliers.
Koll, W. and A. Watt (2018):       
“Convergence and stability in the 
Euro Area through effective macro-
economic policy coordination”,    
IMK Study 61e, Düsseldorf.Divergence in nominal wages need not have implications for external competitive-
ness, namely to the extent that they reflect productivity rather than nominal price-
wage dynamics. However, a look at nominal unit labour costs shows that this has 
largely not been the case, as has been pointed out in previous iAGS reports (Figure 2).
Even allowing for productivity, nominal wage trends in Greece, Ireland, Italy and 
Spain (also Luxembourg) overshot considerably up to the crisis, while Germany and 
Austria undershot. This went hand in hand with current account imbalances that built 
up until a sudden correction in the crisis. Important explanations include the failure to 
keep demand trends in line with domestic potential as well as issues such as housing-
price booms that were not addressed by policymakers. These led simultaneously to 
faster wage-price spirals and widening deficits in countries such as Greece and Spain 
and stagflation and growing surpluses in, notably, Germany. Since the crisis, a substan-
tial, but one-sided adjustment has occurred. Most countries are now, in terms of the 
overall trajectory, grouped quite tightly, slightly above the euro area average.7 Italy 
and Germany are notable for having made only a very limited downward and upward 
correction respectively since the crisis. Reflecting this one-sided adjustment, the 
current account balance of the euro area as a whole has moved very substantially and 
persistently into surplus. This is unsustainable, however, as is shown by recent debates 
and disputes at the global level regarding trade policy. This makes it all the more 
important that domestic demand is underpinned from the wage side.
It does not follow, however, that “wage policy”—the various wage-determination 
mechanisms operating in member states—bears sole responsibility for ensuring appro-
priate wage and price trends. Rather this is the responsibility of the macroeconomic 
policy mix in each country. Wage policy will only be able to play a role in conjunction 
with fiscal (and possibly macroprudential) policies that work symmetrically to keep 
demand close to potential output, avoiding persistent stagnations and curtailing 
booms (Koll and Watt, 2018).
Figure 2. Trend in nominal unit labour costs in the euro area
2000=100
Source: AMECO.
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work done in earlier iAGS reports. One is that the ongoing reform debate on EA 
economic governance needs to pay greater attention to achieving mutually compatible 
nominal wage and price developments in all member states. The second is the need to 
strengthen national wage-bargaining systems.
In order to ensure the former, the EA’s economic governance needs appropriate 
reforms. At a minimum, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure needs to be 
adapted so as to make it symmetrical in operation, and its influence on national policy 
needs to be increased vis-à-vis the narrow fiscal rules. These should be changed to 
improve the focus on achieving inflation rates close to the central bank target, rather 
than on (arbitrary) debt ratios. A great role should be given in economic policy-making 
to the social partners, so that wage and price developments are given more weight in 
economic policy deliberations. 
Regarding wages, possible tools include the coordination of national wage policies 
over the long-term, a generalization of minimum wages in all countries, a better regu-
lation of posted workers to avoid unfair competition, mandatory periodic wage 
negotiations at the branch level (which would include nominal re-adjustments) and so 
forth. Regarding fiscal policy and the governance of the EA, possible tools include the 
coordination of fiscal devaluations (i.e. tax shifting from social security contributions to 
VAT), the substitution of energy imports particularly in the South by boosting invest-
ment in renewable energy, and in particular fiscal re-evaluations in some countries 
(Germany, Netherlands, Ireland). 
3. Economic governance in the euro area: where do  
we stand? 
In light of the remaining imbalances in the euro area, the need to reform govern-
ance has not diminished, and many proposals have emerged. Yet, the measures under 
consideration – some of which we analyse below – are rather weak and there has been 
much foot-dragging.
On banking and financial matters, while some substantial steps have been taken, 
such as EU-level supervision of the largest banks, the Banking Union (BU) is remains 
work in progress. First, a few countries are still reluctant to adopt the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS) out of fear that well-funded deposit guarantee schemes 
(DGS) could be tapped to compensate for underfunded ones. The incomplete adop-
tion of the BU also highlights the lack of the political will needed to ensure the 
homogenous regulation and supervision of banks across the EU. Second, the incom-
plete adoption of a BU poses a threat to the discretionary character of ECB monetary 
policy. Indeed, without a fully operational Single Resolution Fund (SRF), the BU may be 
insufficient to ensure banking stability. The ECB could need to come to the rescue with 
extended unconventional policies. At a time of tapering measures by the ECB, and yet 
in a low interest rate environment, the risks of financial instability are likely to intensify: 
the search for higher yields may feed an excessive appetite for risk. Consequently, 
macroprudential policies are sorely needed to limit risk. In the Statement of the Euro 
Summit of 14 December 2018, the Eurogroup announced a reform of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), endorsing a Common Backstop to the SRF that will help 
resolve bank crises. However, other important measures like a non-performing loan 
(NPL) Prudential Backstop remain to be discussed and leave the BU incomplete. N° 49, 5 février 2019.
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Gechert, S. and A. Rannenberg 
(2018): “Which fiscal multipliers are 
regime-dependent? A meta-regres-
sion analysis”, Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 32: 1160-1182.
Watt, A. (2011): “Strengthening the 
automatic stabilisers in Europe: Why, 
what and how?”, in T. Niechoj et al. 
(eds.), Stabilising an unequal econo-
my? Public debt, financial regulation 
and income distribution, Metropolis: 
197-220.One year and a half after Macron’s speech at La Sorbonne and following the 
German election, envisaged euro area policy reforms have not moved forward much: 
migration and defence issues, and also Brexit, have taken priority over substantial 
reform proposals to fix macroeconomic problems like real divergence and the 
economic slowdown. During the Euro Summit of last December, a budgetary instru-
ment aimed at “convergence and competitiveness for the euro area”, possibly 
extended to Exchange Rate Mechanism II member states, has been planned. Beyond 
the question of the size of this new budget, which will be decisive for understanding 
the effectiveness of the new system, its structural focus can prove very useful to boost 
macroeconomic activity via an impetus to public investment. According to Gechert 
and Rannenberg's meta-analysis (2018), the fiscal policy most likely to produce a large 
multiplier effect (a large GDP effect) is public investment. This instrument can therefore 
promote real convergence between the member states, especially if it is allocated 
primarily to regions and States whose development is lagging behind, in accordance 
with the criteria that already apply to the economic, social and territorial cohesion 
policy of the EU budget. 
That said, the stabilization property of the budget, which was part of Macron’s 
speech at La Sorbonne and part of the Franco-German Meseberg Declaration (June 
2018), is missing in the Statement of the Euro Summit. That leaves the question of 
automatic stabilisation measures working across borders (not to mentioned discre-
tionary policies) within the EMU unanswered. The rationale for a euro area smoothing 
mechanism is clear. Without it, recent history has made it clear that member states 
encountering a negative shock can quickly come under pressure from the markets or 
due to the fiscal rules (which rely on unobservable potential output and output gaps, 
and thus do not in practice reliably distinguish between structural and cyclical budget 
positions). This puts undue pressure on governments during downswings, as they are 
forced into pro-cyclical spending cuts or tax hikes. Cross-border stabilisers would then 
support demand during downswings, and they would also dampen demand in 
booming economies, constraining governments to run tighter policies in “good 
times”. Overall such stabilisers would help reduce the cyclical divergence that proved 
so damaging in the run-up to the crisis.
This approach should not be seen as being in opposition to, or a substitute for, a 
policy of strengthening national automatic stabilisers. This former approach increases 
the stability of the currency area as a whole; each member state has an interest in other 
members having strong stabilisers, suggesting a need for coordination to bring about 
an upward convergence in this regard (Watt, 2011). The fiscal rules—at least the 
medium-term objective and the expenditure rule—would in principle take account of 
the greater amplitude of the swings in the government balance. Still, provisions would 
need to be in place to prevent automatically rising deficits in a downswing leading to 
market pressures on sovereign bond markets.
The need for greater automatic stabilisation, including of a cross-border nature, in a 
monetary union is undisputed. Yet, no step has been made in this direction in the euro 
area. This will leave the burden of a future economic crisis on the ECB and on national 
governments, provided they recover margins for manoeuvre before it happens  ■riefs  Guillaume Allègre
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